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Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Utah Const, art. I, S 14s
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
isue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5)(a)i
(5) Prohibited acts E—Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of
this section, a person not authorized under
this chapter who commits any act declared to
be unlawful under this section, Chapter 37a,
Title 58, the Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or
under Chapter 37b, Title 58, the Imitation
Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction
subject to the penalties and classifications
under Subsection (5)(b) if the act is
committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary
or secondary school or on the grounds of
any of those schools;
(ii) in those portions of any building,
park, stadium, or other structure or
grounds which are, at the time of the act,
being used for an activity sponsored by or
through a school under Subsection
(5)(a)(i);
(iii) within 1,000 feet of any
structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsection (5)(a)(1) or (ii); or
(iv) with a person younger than 18
years of age, regardless of where the act
occurs.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Lane Stromberg, was charged with Unlawful
Possession of Cocaine with the Intent to Distribute within 1000
feet of a school, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(Supp. 1989), and Unlawful Possession of
-2-

Marijuana within 1000 feet of a school, a Third Degree Felony, in
violation of
135-36).

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) (R.

Defendant was convicted of Unlawful Possession of

Marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school, a Third Degree Felony,
after a jury trial held September 21 and 22, 1988, in the Second
Judicial District, in and for Davis County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Rodney S. Page, Judge, presiding (R. 81). He was
acquitted of the charge of possession of cocaine (R. 83).
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Page on November 1, 1988, to a
term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined
$4,000 plus a surcharge of $1000 (R. 172).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 20, 1988, Judge Alfred C. Van Wagenen issued a
search warrant for the defendant's home at 1487 South 1250 West,
Syracuse, Utah. (R. 9-10).
Affidavit.)

(See Appendix "A"; Search Warrant and

The search warrant was issued based on probable

cause shown in an affidavit submitted by Syracuse Chief of Police
John Gardiner. (R. 5-7). The affidavit stated that the officer
had reason to believe that controlled substances and drug
paraphernalia were being possessed illegally at defendant's
address.

Icl. The affidavit was based on information which was

disclosed on April 25, 1988 in an interview between Syracuse
Chief of Police John Gardiner and Tessie Heber who had accused
defendant of unlawful sexual intercourse. (R. 6, S.T. 13).
Because the transcripts have not been assigned appellate record
numbers, the trial record will be referred to as "R.", the trial
transcript of September 21, 1988 as "Tl."# the trial transcript
of September 22, 1988, as MT2.# and the suppression hearing
transcript as MS.T.M
-3-

Tessie was fifteen years old at the time of the sexual
encounter and was a friend of the defedant's fifteen-year-old
daughter. (R. 6, S.T. 50, 152-53).

The encounter occurred in the

D's bedroom during the first week of March 1988. (R. 6, S.T. 16)
Tessie informed Chief Gardiner that during her numerous visits to
defendant's home in the last year and a half, she had observed an
ongoing pattern of illegal drug activites (R. 6). Tessie
observed defendant smoke marijuana on 3 or 4 occasions and saw
several marijuana pipes lying around the house on a continuing
basis at various locations including the headboard of defendant's
waterbed, the kitchen area, and the basement. (R. 6, S.T. 17).
Tessie explained that the last time she had been in defendant's
home was during the first week of March when the sexual incident
occurred and that she had observed a marijuana pipe on that
occasion (R. 6, S.T. 21).
The affidavit further stated that Chief Gardiner
verified Tessie's relationship with defendant's daughter and that
Tessie had no juvenile record. (S.T. 56, 167-68).

Gardiner also

determined that defendant had a prior conviction for possession
of marijuana in 1980 and that persons who smoke marijuana often
retain possession of pipes and other paraphernalia for up to
seven years. (S.T. 118, 121-22).
On May 20, 1988, the search warrant was executed. (R.
8). The search of defendant's home and garage produced over 100
grams of marijuana, over a kilo of cocaine, five marijuana pipes,
and other drug paraphernalia. (R. 11-14).

The marijuana pipes

were found in defendant's bed frame and in the vanity of

defendant's bathroom. (Tl. 99, 175-76).

The marijuana was found

in a plastic baggie and in mason jars located on the headboard of
defendant's bed and also in the kitchen. (Tl. 97-98).

The

cocaine was located in a Coleman cooler in the garage. (Tl. 14951).

Drug paraphernalia, such as a tri-beam scales, a spoon, a

razor blade, mannitol (cocaine cutting agent), and several
screens, were found in and near the defendant's desk in the
basement. (Tl. 183-84, 190). A white residue on the scales
tested positive for cocaine. (Tl. 48).
On August 16, 1988, D filed a motion to suppress the
evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant (R. 54-55).
After a hearing on September 2, 1988, Judge Page denied
defendant's suppression motions.

(R. 69-75).

At trial, defendant admitted to having used both
marijuana and cocaine in the past. (Tl. 2-103).

Defendant

testified that the last time he had used cocaine was in May 1988
(Tl. 104). He testified he knew marijuana was in the headboard
of his bed and that marijuana pipes were in his bathroom vanity
(T2. 106-08).

Defendant's girlfriend, Helen Watkins, testified

and verified that she and defendant had smoked marijuana together
in the defendant's bedroom (T2. 51). Greg Wiser, defendant's
friend, also testified that he had smoked marijuana with
defendant (T. 2-145).

Defendant's sixteen-year-old daughter

testified at the suppression hearing that she had seen marijuana
pipes in their home (S.T. 157). She also testified that she knew
defendant kept marijuana in their home (S.T. 158).

-5-

Based on the evidence adduced at trial, the jury found
defendant guilty of possession of marijuana within 1000 feet of a
school (T2. 159-161).

Defendant now appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Judge Page properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence where the affidavit in support of the
search warrant contained sufficient information to support the
magistrate's finding of probable cause.

The information showing

the continuing nature of defendant's illegal drug possession and
use justified a finding that under the totality of the
circumstances it could be reasonably inferred that evidence of
illegal drugs would be located at defendant's home.

Moreover,

great deference should be afforded a magistrate's finding of
probable cause.

Overturning such a finding by a magistrate, such

as in this case, is proper only if the reviewing court firmly
believes that a mistake has been made.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5)(a)(iii)(Supp. 1989), which
enhances the penalty for drug activity occurring within 1000 feet
of a school, is constitutionally sound in light of the State's
strong interest in eradicating drug use among school children.
Since increasing the penalties for drug activities near schools
is a rational means of achieving the State's interest, the
enhancement statute should be upheld as constitutional.

-£_

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH
WARRANT
On appeal, defendant challenges the district court's
denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to
the search warrant.

Specifically, defendant alleges there was no

probable cause because the information contained in the affidavit
2
supporting the search warrant was stale.
In determining the validity of a search warrant, the
Utah Supreme Court has limited a court's review to whether the
judge "had a substantial basis to conclude that in the totality
of the circumstances, the affidavit adequately established
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant."

State v.

Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987). "Probable cause," in this
context, "is nothing more than a reasonable belief that the
evidence sought is located at the place indicated by the
policeman's affidavit." United States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012,
1014 (10th Cir. 1982) .
Moreover, "[a] reviewing court should pay great
deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause."
State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1983); State v. Jordan,
665 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 1983).

Since it is the duty and

prerogative of the magistrate to determine the sufficiency of the
2
Because defendant does not support his claim with separate
state constitutional analysis, this court should consider
defendant's claim based solely on federal constitutional grounds.
See State v. Williams, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 52 n.12 (S. Ct.
05/05/89).
-7-

affidavit, such a determination should not be overturned unless
he or she was clearly in error.
P.2d 334 (1971).

State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 392, 490

More recently, the Utah Supreme Court in State

v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987), stated that "[t]he question
for the appellate court . . . is not whether it would have made
the findings the trial court did, but whether 'on the entire
evidence [it] is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made committed.'" I_d. a t 1258, n.5, quoting
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123
(1969).
Defendant seeks to undermine the magistrate's finding
of probable cause by emphasizing that over two months elapsed
between the observation of marijuana and marijuana pipes in
defendant's home and the issuance of the warrant.
The Fourth Amendment mandates that search warrants be
issued only upon a showing of probable cause and it is undisputed
that time is a critical element in establishing probable cause.
United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331, 1335 (4th Cir. 1984). A
search warrant is said to be stale when the observation of the
incriminating evidence is so remote in time from the application
for the warrant as to render it improbable that the evidence
still exists at the stated location.
In Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932), Chief
Justice Hughes set forth the general rule governing staleness
issues as follows:
While the statute does not fix the time
within which proof of probable cause must be
taken by the judge or commissioner, it is
manifest that the proof must be of facts so

closely related to the time of the issued of
the warrant as to justify a finding of
probable cause at that time. Whether the
proof meets this test must be determined by
the circumstances of each case.
Id. at 210-11.

In considering the "circumstances" of each case,

the "excessive technical dissection of an informant's tip or of
the nontechnical language in the officer's affidavit is illsuited to this task."

State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130.

The mere passage of time alone is not the sole factor
in determining staleness. "The vitality of probable cause cannot
be quantified by simply counting the number of days between the
occurrence of the facts relied upon and the issuance of the
affidavit." United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th
Cir. 1972).

Common sense dictates that together with time, the

court must also consider the nature of the unlawful activity.
Where an affidavit recites a mere isolated violation, it is
reasonable to believe that probable cause quickly dwindles with
the passage of time.

However, if an affidavit recites activity

indicating protracted or continuous conduct, time is of less
significance. United States v. Minis, 666 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.
1982), cert, denied, 456 U.S 946 (1982).
Accordingly, many courts have found probable cause to
exist where the illegal activity was on-going in nature, despite
substantial gaps between the observation of the evidence at the
particular premises and the issuance of a search warrant.

In the

Fifth Circuit determined that the ongoing nature of a marijuana
cultivating operation warranted the magistrate's inference that
marijuana plants observed in June would still be present in

•9-

October.

Rl.

See also, United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782

(8th Cir. 1980) (ongoing loansharking operation); State v. Hyde,
574 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1978) (ongoing drug smuggling operation);
United States v. Beltempo, 675 F.2d 472 (2nd Cir. 1982)(52 days
would not vitiate probable cause for ongoing scheme of illegal
importation of heroin).
Courts have also noted that the business of dealing in
illegal drugs is ordinarily a regenerating activity carried on
over a period of time and that probable cause may continue for
several weeks, if not months, of the last reported instance of
suspected activity.

United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d

1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986); Davidson v. State, 458 A.2d 875, 880
(Md. App. 1983).

Thus, a warrant authorizing a search for

controlled substances may be properly issued weeks after an
informant observes the illegal drugs.

United States v. Angulo-

Lopez , 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (approximately 24
days); Davidson v. State, 458 A.2d 875, 879 (Md. App. 1983)(19
days); State v. Blaurock, 143 N.J. Super 476, 363 A.2d 909 (1976)
(18 days).
The Utah Supreme Court has also upheld search warrants
where there was a reasonable inference that the drug activity was
of a continuous nature.

In State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258

(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court found that a search warrant
for marijuana was not stale although the affidavit failed to
state the date when the informant observed contraband at
defendant's residence.

Notwithstanding the fact that the

magistrate had no knowledge of how remote the information was,

the Court held that "the affidavit in the instant case, couched
as it is in the present-tense language which described on-going
criminal activity, clearly refutes any contention that it was
based upon stale information."

Jd.

(Citations omitted.)

The

Anderton court upheld that search warrant because "a common-sense
reading of that affidavit suggested the continuing nature of the
drug's presence." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131.
In the case at bar, the affidavit in totality supports
a determination that defendant's involvement with marijuana was
protracted and continuous in nature.
Warrant and Affdiavit.)

(See Appendix "A"; Search

The affidavit alleged not a single

incident, but a series of incidents which commenced February 14,
1980 and continued until at least the first week of March 1987
when the informant saw a marijuana pipe in defendant's home. (R.
6, S.T. 21). The magistrate knew that defendant had been
convicted of possession of marijuana in 1980 (R. 7). He knew
that over the last year and half, defendant had been observed
smoking marijuana three or four times in his home and that as
late as March 1988 there was evidence of contraband in
defendant's home (R. 6). The magistrate also knew that defendant
had drug paraphernalia in several locations in his house (R. 6).
The affidavit established that defendant followed a
persistent pattern of criminal involvement relating to illegal
narcotics.

The continuing nature of defendant's drug involvement

suggests the continuing validity of the information contained in
the affidavit.

Presented with this evidence, the magistrate was

justified in drawing the inference that at the time of the
warrant application, probable cause existed that defendant still
•11-

possessed incriminating evidence at his home.

Thus, the validity

of the search warrant should be upheld.
Even assuming the affidavit was inadequate due to
staleness, this Court should not exclude the evidence where the
search was conducted in "good faith." See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984) .
In Leon, the lower court had suppressed evidence
obtained pursuant to a search warrant because the underlying
affidavit contained "fatally stale" information and an inadequate
basis upon which to determine the reliability and credibility of
the informant.

]jd. at 904. The Leon court overturned the

suppression order and held that the exclusionary rule does not
apply to evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable
reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate, but which warrant is ultimately found to be invalid.
Id. at 905-25.

See also United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727

(4th Cir. 1988) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule was
sufficient to insulate warrant from attack of staleness); People
v. Deitchman, 695 P.2d 1146 (Colo. 1985) (good faith exception
applies to staleness issues).
In the case at bar, the search warrant had been issued
by a detached and neutral magistrate (R. 9-10).

The officers,

reasonably relied on the warrant insearching only those places
and on those objects covered by the warrant.

Moreover, in

denying defendant's motion for suppression, Judge Page found that
the officer had acted with objective good faith and found that
the evidence was admissible under the good-faith exception (R.

69-74 )
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Defendant also argues that the search warrant was
pretextual.

However, as shown abovef the information contained

in the affidavit was sufficient to establish pro:.:.
support the issuance of the search warrant.

cause to

More importantly,

defendant fails to give any legal analysis or authority setting
forth the applicable legal principles in support of his pretext
argument

In that "[t]he burden of showing error is on the party
M
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State v. Jones , 65 7 i: ?-1 ] ?63 ,

. • State should n~t ho put to the task of

developing defendant ? is'li. arguments

' citing relevant case

a u 11 i o i i t y t : • s i , , . * • : «-

i a ] ] e g a t i c • :i :t s .

.

Accordingly, this Court need not address this issue.

State v.

Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 134 4 (Utah 1984), S e e also, Graco Fishing
& Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074
(Utah 1988) .
POINT II
THE PENALTY ENHANCEMENT FOR DRUG ACTIVITIES
NEAR A SCHOOL UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 58-378(5)(a)(iii) (SUPP. 1989), IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY BASED ON A LEGI UMA I E
GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST.
Defendant contends that Utah Code Ann, % "LiH-j •
8 ( 5 ) ( a ) (i I I ) ( Supfi). 1989 ) , is unconstitutional because it
art i tr ari 1 > and capricious 1 } enhances ppna 11 I es :f n i: narcotic
activities occurring near a s rhool , Defendant s argument does
not withstand constitutional analysis.

In evaluating a constitutional challenge to a
legislative enactment, the Utah Supreme Court will view the
challenged statute with a strong presumption of
constitutionality, resolving any reasonable doubt in favor of
validity and constitutionality of the statute. Sims v. Smith, 571
P.2d 586 (Utah 1977).

Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah

1974); Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (Utah 1975), cert, denied, 436
U.S. 927 (1978).

Moreover, the burden of successfully

challenging a statute as unconstitutional falls on the one
attacking it.

Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2

Cottonwood Heights, 23 Utah 2d 181, 460 P.2d 814 (1969).
It is undisputed that a state has broad power to
regulate the administration, sale, prescription, possession and
use of narcotics.

Under substantive due process analysis, such

regulations are constitutional if the means selected in the
statute have a rational relation to a legitimate governmental
objective sought to be obtained. See United States v. Holland,
810 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying "rationale basis"
test to an equal protection challenge that federally enhanced
penalties for selling drugs within 1000 feet of schoolyard is
both over and underinclusive.)

Thus, the statute must be upheld

if wany state of facts rationally justifying it is demonstrated
to or perceived by the courts."

United States v. Maryland

Savings-Share Insurance Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970).
In the case at bar, defendant challenges the
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(5)(a)(iii) (Supp.
1989) which provides for enhanced penalties upon narcotics

convictions where the drug activi ty occurred within one thousand
feet of a public or private elementary or secondary school,
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The United States Congress has enacted similar
legislation t: ) iat ei :t! iai Ic:es pei ia,1 1:i es £oi ::Ii: ug ac 1:iv :i ty occurri ng
near schools.

In 1982, United States Senator Paula Hawkins

introduced the enhancement statute following a congressional
heard ng on drug abuse in .American school systems before tl le
Subcommittee on Investigations and General Oversight of the
Senate committee on Labor and Human Resources. A t the I learing,
Senator Hawkins pointed o"+- *-**»*-:
an alarming number of school children, often
as young as 11 or 1 2 , ' were using drugs and
alcohol and that these drugs were 'often sold
directly to the juveniles on or near school
grounds by adult dealers. These transactions
take place in remote outdoor areas, at local
hangouts, or at nearby homes or apartment."
130 Cong.Rec. S.559 (daily ed. Jan. 3 1 ,
1 9 8 4 ) , T h e 1,000-foot rule w a s devised to
'send a signal to drug dealers that w e will
not tolerate their presence near our schools.
United States v. J o n e s , 7 79 F.2d 121, 122-23, (2nd Ci r
cert, denied, 475 U.!".
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United

r.id 46, 50 (2nd Cir. 1 9 8 5 ) , cert. denied,

475 U.S. 106B
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Likewise, the State of Utah has a legitimate interest
in combatting drug use and related evils among its school
children which justifies the designation of a drug free perimeter
around its schools.

Establishing greater penalties for violating

the drug free perimeter around schools is a rational means of
serving the State's interest of eliminating drug use among and
around school children.
While impliedly conceding a legitimate governmental
interest in curbing drug use among school children, defendant
argues that the statute is overinclusive because it may apply to
drug activity within private dwellings which are proximate to the
school, but which do not involve children.
been repeatedly rejected by other courts.

Such an argument has
See State v. Jones,

779 F.2d 121 (defendant argued enhancement statute was
unconstitutionally overinclusive because it applied to drugs
transactions that involved adults); United States v. Nieves, 608
F.Supp 1147 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (defendant argued the enhancement
statute was unconstitutional because defendant was not permitted
to offer evidence that children were uninjured by the sale);
United States v. Cunningham, 615 F. Supp 519 (D.C.N.Y. 1985)
(defendant argued enhancement statute did not apply to him
because his drug activity only involved adults); United States v.
Holland, 810 F.2d 1215 (defendant argued enhancement statute is
overinclusive because it can apply to drug transactions between
adults that take place within private dwellings proximate to
schools and during times when schools are not in session).
Such arguments focus narrowly on a single illegal drug
transaction while ignoring the broad purpose of the enhancement

statute.

Not on] y w a s the statute designed to punish drug

a c t i v i t y dir e c t l y involvi i ig c 1 :i i II di en * i 1: 1 ii i i c »ne t! ic:>i isand feet of
a s c h o o l , but i t w a s a] so designed to protect schoo, children
from the direct and indirect dangers of narcotics,,

See United

S t a t e s v. Cunningham., 6 1 5 f
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S t a t e , 610 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) , It Is e n o u g h t h a t t h e r e is an
evil at hand for c o r r e c t i o n , and that
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T h e Court

held that it would be a denial of equal protection of the laws,
"if the same identical facts may be used in prosecutions under
two completely integrated statutes, one a misdemeanor and the
other a felony." J^d. at 261. (citations and italics omitted).
In the present case, the two crimes are not identical.
The felony possession statute is distinguishable from the
misdemeanor possession statute because the possession of the
drugs near a school is an additional substantive element of the
felony offense.

Thus, the Legislature has determined that the

act of possessing drugs near a school should be punished more
severely than the mere possession of drugs. As stated above,
such a distinction is manifestly rational.
It is well-established that the Legislature has the
authority to determine the degree of punishment for specific
crimes.

As the Utah Supreme stated in State v. Clark, 632 P.2d

841 (Utah 1981):
It is not unconstitutional for a state to
impose a more severe penalty for a particular
type of crime than the penalty which is imposed
with respect to the general category of crimes
to which the special crime is related or of which
it is a subcategory. . . .
As long as the legislative classifications
are not arbitrary, the fact that conduct
violates both a general and a specific
provision of the criminal laws does not
render the legislation unconstitutional, even
though one violation is subject to a greater
sentence.
Id. at 843-44.
The more specific felony statute is noticeably
different from the general misdemeanor crime of mere possession
of a controlled substance because it defines possession of drugs
-18-

near a school as a substantive element.

Because of the

destructive nature of narcotics and the need for heightened
deterrence when children are involved, such a distinction is not
"arbitrary."

Therefore, the prosecutor acted within his

prosecutorial discretion when he charged defendant with a
violation of a statute that "applies more specifically to the
[defendant's] offense. . . ."

Rammel v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108,

1110 (Utah 1977) .
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, defendant's conviction and
sentence should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this <^^§^-day Q f June, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Daniel R. Knowton, attorney for appellant, 214 10th Avenue,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103, this ^^y^Tiay of June, 1989.
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APPENDIX A

MELVIN C. WILSON 3513
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

s

In Re: Search of the
premises described as
1487 South 1250 West,
Syracuse, Davis County, Utah,
a single-family dwelling.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

SEARCH WARRANT
:
:

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by
John Gardiner, a peace officer employed by Syracuse City, that he
has reason to believe that in the below-described premises there
are items which constitute evidence of the commission of a crime.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED in the daytime to make
immediate search of the premises described as:
1487 South 1250 West
Syracuse, Davis County, Utah,
A single-family dwelling
and search for the following property:
Controlled substances,
Drug paraphernalia,
Identification cards, records, accounts,

books, pictures, receipts, personal
property or other items evidencing
ownership, occupation or control of the
above premises or rooms therein.
And if you find the same or any part thereof to bring it
forthwith before me at the Circuit Court, County of Davis, or
retain such property in your custody subject to the order of this
Court.
Given under my hand and dated this ^ZO

day of May,

1988.

Cte&sc(Auk,.+
CircuitJ/Court Judge

MELVIN C. WILSON 3513
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
In Re: Search of the
premises described as

:

AFFIDAVIT FOR

::

SEARCH WARRANT

1487 South 1250 West,

Syracuse, Davis County, Utah,
a single-family dwelling.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

:

Before Alfred C. VanWagenen, Circuit Court Judge, the
undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has
probable cause to believe that on the premises which are
described as:
1487 South 1250 West
Syracuse, Davis County, Utah,
A single-family dwelling
there is now certain property described as:
Controlled substances,
Drug paraphernalia,
Identification cards, records, accounts,
books, pictures, receipts, personal
property or other items evidencing
ownership, occupation or control of the
above premises or rooms therein.

xne racts to establish the issuance of this warrant are
as follows:
1.

Affiant is a peace officer employed by Syracuse City

and is involved in the investigation of an illegal sexual act
alleged to have been committed by Lane Stromberg.
2.

On the 25th of April, 1988, a 15 year old girl stated

to affiant that she was acquainted with Lane Stromberg, an adult
male, and that she had had sexual intercourse with Stromberg at
his residence at 1487 South 1250 West in Syracuse, Utah, during
the first week of March, 1988. The girl stated that this
occurred in an upstairs bedroom.
3.

The 15 year old girl stated that she has been to

Stromberg's home several times in the past year and a half, as
she is a close friend to Stromberg's own teen age daughter.
During that time, the 15 year old said she has seen Stromberg
smoking marijuana three or four times.

She has seen various

marijuana pipes lying around the house in various locations
including on the bookshelf of Stromberg's water bed in his
bedroom, in the kitchen area of the home, and in the room where
Stromberg keeps his personal computer, in the basement.

The last

time she saw a marijuana pipe at his residence was the first week
of March, 1988.
4.

She has not been in the home since then.

Affiant believes the girl is giving reliable

information.

Affiant has verified with a school counselor that

the girl and Stromberg's daughter are good friends and that the
girl has no juvenile court record.

Furthermore affiant has
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JOSEPH E TESCH
CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF UTAH

October 27, 1988

Mary Noonan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

State v. Lane C. Strombergf Case No. 860618-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 24(j) (1989), respondent
cites State v. Lonnie L. Moore, No. 870470 slip op. (Utah Oct.
25, 1989) as supplemental authority for the court's consideration
relevant to Point II of respondent's brief in the above-entitled
case.

Assistant Attorney General
DRL:bks
cc:

Daniel Knowlton

checked Lane Stromberg's criminal record, which shows a
conviction for possession of marijuana dated February 14# 1980.
5.

Affiant has spoken to Lon Brian, an undercover

narcotics officer employed by the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike
Force.

Officer Brian has received training from the federal DEA

regarding drugs and undercover drug operations, has worked for
nearly three years as an undercover narcotics officer, and has
witnessed thousands of drug transactions involving the use,
possession, and sales of controlled substances.
6.
case.

Officer Brian is familiar with the facts of this

Based on his training and experience, a person who

occasionally smokes marijuana in his own home retains possession
of the pipes or other paraphernalia for long periods of time, up
to several years.
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued
for the search of the above-described premises and the seizure
of any of the said items.

Affianjt
Subscribed and sworn to me this J A Q day of May, 1988.

Circuit /rfourt Judge

COUNTY OF DAVIS

RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT

I hereby c e r t i f y , and return, t h a t by v i r t u e of the w i t h i n
Search Warrant to me d i r e c t e d , Ihave*searched for the goods and
c h a t t e l s t h e r e i n named, at the place therein d e s c r i b e d :
(Strike
e i t h e r (1) or ( 2 ) , whichever i s inapplicable)
(1) and that I have such goods and c h a t t e l s before the
Court, described as f o l l o w s :

On May 20, 1988 the search of the residence was executed as per
the Search Warrant issued through the Clearfield Circuit Court. Please find
attached copies of a l l items secured as evidence.

the o f f i c e r by whom t h i s
I,
Lon Brian,
Warrant was executed, do swear that trie above inventory c o n t a i n s a t r u e
and d e t a i l e d account of a l l the property taken by me on the Warrant

Peacq^pfficer,
Subscribed and sworn to before rmja t h i s

Affiant
day of N f i i l L

